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Location Privacy in Device-Dependent Location-Based Services:
Challenges and Solution
Yuhang Wang1, Yanbin Sun1, ∗, Shen Su1, Zhihong Tian1, Mohan Li1, Jing Qiu1 and
Xianzhi Wang2
Abstract: With the evolution of location-based services (LBS), a new type of LBS has
already gain a lot of attention and implementation, we name this kind of LBS as the
Device-Dependent LBS (DLBS). In DLBS, the service provider (SP) will not only send the
information according to the user’s location, more significant, he also provides a service
device which will be carried by the user. DLBS has been successfully practised in some of
the large cities around the world, for example, the shared bicycle in Beijing and London.
In this paper, we, for the first time, blow the whistle of the new location privacy challenges
caused by DLBS, since the service device is enabled to perform the localization without
the permission of the user. To conquer these threats, we design a service architecture
along with a credit system between DLBS provider and the user. The credit system tie
together the DLBS device usability with the curious behaviour upon user’s location privacy,
DLBS provider has to sacrifice their revenue in order to gain extra location information of
their device. We make the simulation of our proposed scheme and the result convince its
effectiveness.
Keywords: Location privacy, device-dependent location-based service, location-based
service, credit system, location privacy preserving mechanism, shared bicycle.
1 Introduction
Location-based services (LBSs) have changed the way of getting information in daily life.
Different kind of LBSs, such as positioning, navigation, POI searching and social network
check-in, are already the fundamental applications in almost everyone’s smartphone.
Though may be different in details, all of these LBSs belong to the information service,
which means that the user will send her location (along with other query or personal
information) information to the certain LBS provider, and the provider send back the
information the user needs. One most basic fact is that the location is firstly generated
on the user side (for example, a smartphone) and then be sent to the LBS provider, LBS
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provider cannot know the user’s location till the user wills it.
Meanwhile, location privacy preservation has gain increasing attention along with the
popularity of LBSs, tremendous of works have been focused on the location privacy
preserving mechanism (LPPM), and a lot of outstanding works have been proposed to
preserve the location privacy of the user while she enjoying LBS. The LPPM will ensure
the location privacy has been preserved before the location was sent to the LBS provider.
Although various of schemes such as anonymity, obfuscation and noise addition have been
performed by these LPPMs, the threat that the LBS provider may steal the user’s location
unknowingly is out of the LPPM’s concern.
The recently noteworthy evolution of LBS may change the whole picture of LBS and
the LPPM upon it. In this paper, we define this novel LBS as the Device-dependent
Location-based Service (DLBS). Quite different from LBS, which is considered as a pure
information service, DLBS provides not just the location-based information, but also the
entity device-dependent service. The types of device are usually the common used utilities,
such as bicycle, laptop, and the mobile power supply equipments. Moreover, these devices
are smart chip embedded and self-localizable, and these ability enable the device to be
aware of its situation and so as to maintain the DLBS system.
Although DLBS has greatly expanded the concept of LBS, however, from the view of
location privacy, it also completely overturned the architecture and the threat model of the
existing LPPMs. This huge change mainly comes down to the alter of the way of location
obtaining by the service provider. Just as the location privacy has been regarded as the part
of the basic human rights, the very right of the DLBS provider to know the location of their
own device is also a solid fact. This two basic rights belonging to the user and the DLBS
provider has formed a subtle conflict, which needs to be solved and the traditional LPPMs
failed to.
In order to solve this conflict, which means that to preserve the location privacy of DLBS
user and at the same time enable the DLBS provider to be aware of the location of
their device, in this paper, we design a DLBS service framework, including the system
architecture and the judge-and-weight credit system. Our scheme encourage the DLBS
provider to obtain the device location that just enough to maintain their service. As to the
force query of the device location, DLBS provider has to sacrifice the usability of the whole
DLBS system.
In general, we mainly make contributions as follows:
1. To the best of our knowledge, we for the first time defined a new type of
device-dependent LBS, and we pointed out the location privacy challenges caused by
DLBS.
2. To conquer the location privacy threats in DLBS, we designed a DLBS framework, in
which we bind together the location privacy and the usability of the DLBS system, DLBS
provider has to be cautious when he is curious on the location of user.
3. We proposed the credit system rules to balance the location privacy and DLBS usability,
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and we analysed these rules with game theory, the result shows that the location privacy
can be preserved on the best utmost.
4. We simulate our system on a virtual shared bicycle system, and the simulation result
verifies the effectiveness of our scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 Introduce the DLBS in details,
and list the changes and the challenges it brings to location privacy. We describe the design
details of our scheme in Section 3. Sections 4provide the analyse and the experimental
simulation. Section 5briefly reviews the related work, and finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Location privacy challenges in DLBS
2.1 Device-dependent location-based service
DLBS greatly expands the range of LBS, as its a newly practiced form of LBS, in this
section, we fist list the features of DLBS which this paper refers to.
1. A localizable service device is involved in the procedure of DLBS, the device will serve
the user, while at the same time perform the localization and communicate with the DLBS
provider all by itself and without the awareness of user.
2. DLBS devices are separated in the urban area and ready to serve. In order to enjoy
DLBS, user needs to move close to a DLBS device and activate it. For instance, scanning
the QR code of the device with her smart phone.
3. During the service, the device will offer the user the special capacity, also it will be
taken by the user. During DLBS, the locations of the device and the user are regarded as
the same.
4. For the purpose of maintaining the DLBS system, and also by his proprietary rights
on the DLBS devices, DLBS provider need to learn the locations of the devices. This
requirement (also it is his right) go against the location privacy preservation need of the user.
In the most basic condition, DLBS provider at least needs to know the locations of those
devices which are not in service, so that the DLBS provider can ensure the maintenance of
the DLBS system.
2.2 Location privacy challenges
Due to the features mentioned above, in DLBS scenario, traditional LPPMs and their threat
model are facing the challenges.
1. LPPMs in traditional LBS scenario do not have to consider the situation that the service
provider are able to obtain the location without the permission of user. But in DLBS, this
assumption no longer exist due to the localizable device. This is a disastrous challenge
to those LPPMs that only considering how to perform the preservation on the location
information which are about to send to the service provider.
2. In general, from the legal perspective, the DLBS provider do have the right to know
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the location of their DLBS device. This is at least an equally right than the proposition of
location privacy in the user side. This contradiction also beyond the scope of capacity of
traditional LPPMs. New type of LPPM is needed to balance the location privacy demands
and the "right to know" fact.
3. Specifically, in DLBS scenario, the activation location, where the user takes the device
and activates the DLBS, is almost impossible to hide, since the DLBS provider has to know
the location of his own device.
Combining the above mentioned DLBS features and the location privacy challenges, in this
paper, we design a brand new DLBS framework to cope with these issues. Generally, in our
framework, both the location privacy demands and the requirement of location-awareness
from the user and DLBS provider side will be respected, protected and fulfilled. The basic
principle of our framework is that we only encourage the DLBS provider to ask for the
location information which is just enough for the maintenance at the minimum level of
satisfaction. Finally, our framework have the compatibility to the traditional LPPMs, user
is still available to use their LPPM to preserve their location privacy on our framework. In
the next section, we will introduce it in detail.
3 Our proposed schemes
In our framework, we firstly unbundle the direct communication between the user and the
DLBS provider, also between the DLBS provider and their devices. A trusted third party

















Figure 1: System architecture of our framework. TTP proxy maintain the location updating
of the user and DLBS device, and the credit score system
In general, DLBS provider broadcasts the locations of the devices to the TTP proxy, and the
user query the available device from TTP proxy. When the location information is needed,
the TTP proxy receives the location request from the DLBS provider, decides whether
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to fulfill him depending on his credit value. On the user side, if the location request is
approved, she can use the LPPM to perform a certain degree of preservation, and send back
the preservation result to the DLBS provider. Next, we details the design of our scheme.
3.1 Basic idea
As DLBS provider has the right to know the location of their devices when necessary, and
this is also a natural right, so we cannot assume the real motivation of DLBS provider
to obtain the location. Therefore, different from the traditional LPPMs, here in DLBS,
we put the user’s location privacy and the usability of the DLBS system on the two sides
of the scale. In other word, we allow the DLBS provider to know the device’s location
(protected by LPPM), but he must bear the corresponding cost. From the perspective of
interests, the DLBS provider must maintain the balance of the scale so that to make his
own DLBS system functional. This means that it cannot excessively grab the user’s location
privacy, but can only obtain the appropriate location information just enough to maintain
the operation of DLBS.
Our system assumption are as follow:
1. The user is honest, she enjoys the DLBS without any wicked idea. She always takes
the DLBS device along with him, and reports her location, although preserved by LPPM,
honestly.
2. The activation location of the user is beyond the protection of our scheme, as introduced
about the features of DLBS, we consider the activation location as the necessary cost to pay
by the user who wants to enjoy DLBS. What we want to preserve in our framework, is the
trajectory information during the DLBS.
3. The DLBS provider is untrusted, curious by honest, he knows the location information
of all the deactivated devices, and he has the right to query the location of the activated
device, if the TTP proxy approve his request, the user has to report a location to him. On
the other hand, since the location query will hurt the usability of DLBS system, the DLBS
provider will always seeking for the benefit maximization between the location privacy and
the system usability.
3.2 The credit score system of DLBS provider
To minimize the location information requirement of maintaining the DLBS system, the
DLBS provider only needs to know the deactivation location of device, where the user
terminates the DLBS and leave the device at. DLBS provider will obtain this location and
updates the state of the device in order to get ready for the next round of service.
In our framework, we set up the credit score system to encourage the DLBS provider to
only request from the TTP proxy the deactivation location of his device. We introduce
the concept of "Trust Coin" which are used by the DLBS provider to get the location
information in exchange on the TTP proxy. We details how this system works as follows:
1. For each time a user activate a DLBS, the system will create a certain amount of TCoin,
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and give them to DLBS provider. In basic condition, for each time of DLBS service, 1
TCoin will be created and will be given to the DLBS.
2. For the in service devices, DLBS provider has to "purchase" the locations of them. He
proposes the bargain to TTP proxy, and TPP proxy will inform the user of this request.
Due to the "right to know" principle, the user has to response this request , however, it is up
to the user who can determine the level of precision of the location DLBS provider could
obtain.
3. We define the precise location worths 1 TCoin, and the value of location output from the
LPPMs depends on the granularity of the privacy level. The lower precision the location is,
the cheaper it will be.
4. Due to the one-to-many relationship between DLBS provider and the users, the DLBS
provider may have the "balance" of TCoin during the runtime of DLBS system. Apparently,
the lesser TCoin remains, the more trustworthy DLBS provider will be. Therefore, in
our system, we define the credit rating of DLBS provider as a number between 0 to 1, 1
indicates that the DLBS provider have no balance of TCoin, and 0 means the balance of
TCoin is equal or greater than the number of the current active users. At last, we further
define the amount of TCoins when created at the beginning of service as 1× C TCoins.
Given the credit score system above and our system assumption, we can ensure the DLBS
provider will behave to maintain the usability of his DLBS system, for the rational situation,
this is prior to obtaining the location privacy of users. In our system, the ideal case is that
the DLBS provider always spend his TCoin on requesting the precise location after the end
of DLBS. Since no redundant TCoins left, he will always get 1 TCoin when a DLBS start,
and always spend 1 TCoin after the DLBS end.
In the next section, we will analyse the credit score system, and the behaviors of the
DLBS provider and the user under such rules. Next, based on this credit score system,
we introduce some other detail features and designs of our framework.
3.2.1 LPPM preservation metric
We use the location privacy metric defined in [Shokri, Theodorakopoulos, Le Boudec et al.
(2011)] and quantify the user’s location privacy as the adversary’s expected error. This
metric also indicates how fuzzy the location is after the LPPM’s preservation. Then, we
can use this value to price the cost by DLBS provider to obtain the locations.
3.2.2 Device hiding
For the abuse of TCoins and unable to afford the location obtaining after the DLBS, for the
purpose of practical application, we use the device hiding instead of just letting the device
disappear for ever as the punishment. If the DLBS provider does not require the device’s
location after DLBS, TTP proxy will hide the existence of this device long enough, for
example, 24 hours. This will causes DLBS provider certain financial loss.
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3.2.3 Deactivation delaying
To avoid the deactivation location of DLBS reveals the current location of user, in our
scheme, when a DLBS is end up by the user, we set up a time interval between the end time
of DLBS and the searchable time of DLBS provider. DLBS provder could spend 1 TCoin
for the device location after this delaying period, if he wish to obtain the device location
inside this period, he still has to spend extra TCoins for it.
4 Privacy analysis and system simulation
In this Section, we first analyse our scheme from the view of the DLBS provider and the
user separately. Then we simulate our framework and show its performance against various
of behaviors. In practical, we choose the shared bicycle as the prototype of our simulation,
and the parameters involved in our frameworks are assumed to be rational.
4.1 Analysis
Although the request of the device location from DLBS provider has to be fulfilled, our
system provides a strong repellence against the malicious behaviour upon the location
privacy of users.
First, if the DLBS provider spend his TCoins on requesting the location during DLBS, he
would be incapable to obtain the location of his device after the DLBS, and that means the
property lost as well as the reduction of usability of DLBS system, this is not acceptable
for the DLBS provider.
Second, when the DLBS provider seeks out some balance of TCoins and ready to use them
to obtain more location privacy, he can only remains a time window to do so, because due
to the TCoin generating mechanism, more balance means lesser TCoins gain in each time
of DLBS, and in order to maintain the DLBS system, the provider always needs to spend 1
TCoin each time to obtain the device’s location. this deficit will soon wipes out the DLBS
provider’s TCoins.
At last, even in the situation that the DLBS provider, regardless about all usability and the
benefits, trying very hard to obtain the user’s location, he will get the location information
not better than what he can get in the traditional LBS scenario, because the LPPM of the
user side controls the granularity of the location information send back.
4.2 Simulation
We implement the simulation of our framework on our PC with Intel 8 Core 2.4 Hz
CPU and 16 GB ROM. 1000 devices were launched into a 100 km2 square area. We
randomly trigger the DLBS services and the corresponding random trajectories with
different frequency, the observed outputs are shown and explained in this section. We
design the architecture and the credit score system, different types of behaviors are also
involved in the simulation.
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4.2.1 Functionality of the framework
We investigate our framework to see if it can support the DLBS system running smoothly.
Fig. 2 shows the simulation result of the credit rating, the TCoin balance of the DLBS
provider, and the percentage of the current missing device.








































Figure 2: T vs. TCoins balance, the credit rating and the number of missing device, within a
24 hours simulation. Random number in normal distribution of users visit the DLBS system
and use the device in a random time interval
We assume a honest DLBS provider here to measure the functionality of our framework.
The number of missing devices, which are loss of communication due to the DLBS cannot
afford the request, remain 0 in the whole simulation, since the DLBS keeps holding a
reasonable balance of TCoins. During the mid-term of the simulation when the number
DLBS rises, the balance rises together, and that leads the credit rating of the DLBS provider
declines. Then, as shown in the latter period, the balance keeps consuming, and the credit
rating return to the normal level.
4.2.2 Regulatory mechanism
The regulatory mechanism of the credit score system is tested by performing a shoot up of
the TCoin balance. Fig. 3 shows the change of balance and the score rating when we assign
the balance with 200 upon the same condition in the previous simulation. The shoot up of
balance may happens in real-world situation if the DLBS provider carries out the collusion
attack with the collaborators by sacrificing the usability of DLBS system.
As shown in Fig. 3, the shoot up of balance directly crushed down the credit rating to 0.03
at the beginning, as the result, barely income is generated in the previous few hours, and the
net outflow of TCoin in order to obtain the deivces’ location nearly exhausts the balance
in 8 hours. In other word, even in such a extreme case, the time window for the DLBS
provider to perform the malicious obtaining is less than 8 hour in our simulation.
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Figure 3: T vs. TCoin balance and the credit rating. When we assign the balance of the
beginning as 200
4.2.3 Regulatory mechanism
We further consider the situation that the DLBS provider is willing to sacrifice the DLBS
usability and is very curious about the user’s location privacy. In the former case of
simulation, we consider that the DLBS will use the TCoins to request extra location
information, and the user will use the basic obfuscating LPPM to preserve her location
privacy. Fig. 4 shows the result of this behavior.




































Figure 4: T vs. TCoin balance and the missing devices in percentage. When DLBS provider
spend the balance to request more locations
When DLBS provider spend extra TCoin on requesting the devices’ location, the balance
soon falls close to zero, while remains numbers of in service devices’ location need to be
obtained at later time. As the result, the percentage of missing devices begin to increase,
in our simulation, 45% of all the DLBS devices are missing in the last period, and this is a
disastrous result for the malicious behavior.
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5 Related works
Recent researches tried to built up the entire mechanism of location privacy preservation.
These LPPMs have been well surveyed in Liu et al. [Liu, Darabi, Banerjee et al. (2007);
Ahmadi and Bouallegue (2017); Chow and Mokbel (2011); Krumm (2009)]. Upon these
works, it is necessary to measure how many privacy these LPPMs really offered to the
location, and the location privacy metric were studies in Wernke et al. [Wernke, Skvortsov,
Dürr et al. (2014); Wang, Zhang and Yu (2015); Damiani and Cuijpers (2013); Tippenhauer,
Rasmussen, Pöpper et al. (2009)]. For the LBS scenario, these researches focused on how
to use the location safely.
On the other hand, researches devoted to preserve location privacy in the location getting
scenario, which can be described as how to get the location safely. Literatures such as Li
et al. [Li, Sun, Zhu et al. (2014); Wang, Zhang, Su et al. (2018); Wang, Tian, Zhang et al.
(2018)] provides efficient methods to cope with this threat.
In general, methods including anonymity, obfuscation, noise addition, differential privacy
and the encryption-based method are well deployed and deeply studied in the pas decades
of research. No matter what specific method they wish to perform, they almost shared
the same system model as well as the boundary assumptions. When in the LBS scenario,
they did not concern about the LBS provider could get the location information without
the awareness of the user, or where the location came from. On the other hand, in location
getting scenario, researches also do not care how the location could be generated. In the
new service scenarios such as proposed in Tian et al. [Tian, Cui, An et al. (2018); Li, Sun,
Jiang et al. (2018); Hou, Wei, Wang et al. (2018)], it is inevitable that the location might be
obtained beyond the awareness of the user.
To the best of our knowledge, few of the researches paid enough attention on the
development of LBS and the following location privacy challenge. We for the first time
define the DLBS and the new privacy challenges along with it. Our proposed scheme is the
forefront research which can solve the location privacy challenges in DLBS scenario.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we defined a new type of location-based service which named the
device-dependent location-based service. For DLBS, traditional LPPMs will be invalid
since the overturning system model. Then, based on the credit score system and the proxy
architecture, we designed a brand new DLBS framework, which can preserve the location
privacy efficiently. We balance the location privacy with the usability of DLBS system,
this can leads to the fact that the malicious behavior on location privacy will be bound to
the harm on the usability to the DLBS system. The simulation result indicates that our
framework can preserve the location privacy effectively in the real circumstance.
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